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The more accessible canes are rapidly becoming exhausted, not only 
from the destruction of the forests to make way for agriculture, but 
because of the failure of regeneration to keep pace with collection 
. . . the buyers, who are almost invariably small Chinese shopkeepers, 
cannot afford to be too particular, for they do not care to risk losing 
the advances in goods or cash that they have had to make to the col­
lectors . 1
Although written nearly fifty years ago, the above passage expresses fears 
that are still current among Indonesian foresters, exporters, and government offi­
cials today concerning an important forest product: rattan. The world demand for 
rattan, the spiny climby palms of the Lepidocaryeae subfamily of the family Palmae, 
also known as cane or wicker, is increasing rapidly, and Indonesia produces be­
tween 762 and 90 percent3 of the world's supply. Indonesian exports increased at 
least 200 percent in the ten-year period from 1968 to 1977,'* with rattan generating 
more foreign exchange for Indonesia than any other forest product except log s .5 
Nearly half of these rattan exports come from Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), with 
the largest production area for both wild and cultivated varieties--approximately 
4,375,000 hectares--being the province of East Kalimantan.6
1. J. H. Burkill, A Dictionary of the Economic Products of the Malay Peninsula 
(1935; Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaysia and Singapore, 1966), pp. 1904-5.
2. "Industrialisasi Rotan di Indonesia," Kehutanan Indonesia [Jakarta], 6, no. 7 
(July 1979), pp. 17-29.
3. K. E. Menon, "Rattan in the South East Asian Region," Forest News for Asia 
and the Pacific [Bangkok], 2, no. 4 (November 1978), pp. 32-35.
4. Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Industri Departemen Industri, "Pengem- 
bangan Industri Komodite Export Rotan di Indonesia Didasarkan Pada Teknology 
Tepat" (Paper presented to Discussion of Increasing Production Potential of Non­
timber Forest Products, Jakarta, July 10-12, 1980), p. 7a.
5. Djwa Hui Liang, "Beberapa Pendekatan Dalam Usaha Pelestarian Rotan," typed 
manuscript (South Kalimantan: Dinas Kehutanan Propinsi DATI I, November 1979),
p. 1.
6. Chaiyapechara, "Rattan," Forest News for Asia and the Pacific, 2, no. 4 
(November 1978), p. 38. Most of the data on the natural history of rattan were 
provided by Dr. John Dransfield of Kew Gardens, Surrey, England. In a personal 
communication (1982) Dr. Dransfield described the distribution of rattan in South­
east Asia as "a dartboard with the bull's-eye in Malaysia."
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Recently the riverine and land networks through which rattan is traded have 
expanded dramatically. As a result, collectors complain that they must cover ever 
greater distances to reach areas in the forest where rattan is sufficiently mature to 
harvest. Despite the general awareness that immature canes bring lower prices, 
many collectors have begun to cut young shoots growing in areas closest to their 
riverside villages. Urban buyers and exporters confirm that immature canes com­
prise an increasing percentage of the overall supply.
The central government of Indonesia has drawn up a plan to regulate the trade 
and collection boom by "shortening" the trade networks and eliminating many of the 
trade links currently controlled by "middlemen." The official objectives of this 
plan are to increase the net profits of rattan collectors and to protect the supplies 
by restricting access. But, however well-intentioned, the proposal has not suffi­
ciently considered local variations in environmental, socioeconomic, and cultural 
circumstances nor has it taken into account the differences in the real services pro­
vided by the various middlemen. The proposed system makes no provision for the 
performance of these services and makes no attempt to face the need to redefine 
property rights to a public access resource.
There are thus two purposes to this article. The first is to identify the events 
that have led to the "population explosion" of traders along the rivers and in the 
villages of East Kalimantan and to the lowering in the quality of the rattan. The 
second is to offer an alternative to the planned regulation, proposing instead the 
establishment of upriver rattan plantations and processing centers combined with 
locally specific systems for the definition of property rights, thereby offering a 
greater chance of averting a potential "tragedy of the commons."
Evolution of the Collection and Trade System7
Indonesian rattan was important on the world market as early as the mid-nine­
teenth century.8 At that time the Kutai Sultanate exacted taxes on all forest prod­
ucts transported out of the interior of eastern Borneo via the Mahakam river. 9 The 
actual trade was conducted by the Buginese, and they exchanged imported goods 
such as salt, cloth, and tobacco for the rattan and other forest products collected 
by upriver peoples (various subgroups of Dayaks and some Kutais). Traders who 
sponsored forest collectors paid fees in kind (trade goods or rattan) to village
7. The project, "Interactions between People and Forests in East Kalimantan," 
which supported my research, was funded by the US Forest Service through a 
grant awarded to the East-West Center for US Man and Biosphere (MAB) program, 
"Consortium for the Study of Man's Relationship with the Global Environment."
The project was carried out in association with the Indonesian MAB program and 
with the cooperation of Mulawarman University (Samarinda, East Kalimantan).
8. Harun Alrasyid, "Penanaman Rotan" (Paper presented to Discussion on Increas­
ing Production Potential of Non-timber Forest Projects, Jakarta, July 10-12, 1980),
p. 10.
9. On the trading arrangements of the period, see, for example, Burhan Magenda, 
"East Kalimantan: The Fall of a Dependent Aristocracy," typescript (Ithaca: Cor­
nell University, 1981), pp. 3-4; James F. Warren, "Trade, Raid, Slave: The Socio­
economic Pattern of the Sulu Zone, 1770-1898" (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian 
National University, 1975), pp. 24-26; and a number of nineteenth century articles 
on Borneo (appearing originally in the Singapore Chronicle) , reproduced in J. H. 
Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago (London: CASS, 1967), pp. 29, 55, 67, 69, 
and 106.
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headmen and attempted to remain on good terms with these traditional leaders in 
order to be permitted continuous access to the rattan and forest products within 
their territory.10 Chinese and Banjarese traders joined the Buginese in the early 
twentieth century,11 but the system of paying fees to upriver leaders apparently 
remained the same.
In 1853 the Dutch made Samarinda the center of government for the Assistant 
Residency of East Borneo, and in 1900 the Sultan of Kutai ceded to them the right 
to tax imported trade goods and exported forest produce transported via the Maha- 
kam.12 In exchange the sultan received a yearly allowance and 10 percent of the 
royalties the Dutch exacted from forest products, which was reduced to 5 percent 
by 1920.13 14
The Kutai Sultanate was not abolished until ten years after the Dutch trans­
ferred sovereignty to an independent Indonesia at the end of 1949, but during 
those years the sultan no longer received royalties on the trade in forest products, 
which were sent instead to the central government.11* When East Kalimantan offi­
cially became a province of the Republic of Indonesia in 1957, 15 these taxes went 
directly to the provincial government. While recognizing traditional rights of in­
digenous people to those products of communally owned forest, the Basic Agrarian 
Law of I96016 made no provision for traditional leaders' taxation of wild rattan and 
other forest products.17 As a result of this loss of sovereignty, and revenue, the 
local leaders had little incentive to continue their supervision of the extraction of 
forest products. A social "check" on the practice of ecologically sound harvesting 
procedures was thereby lost. Even the presence of Indonesian government forestry 
and army officials did not serve as such a check, for most of them came from Java 
or Bali and made little effort to learn about aspects of local traditional law.
A number of interrelated events have led to the currently burgeoning trade 
networks. Most of these events have been directly or indirectly related to improved
10. See also, Joseph A. Weinstock, "Land Tenure Practices of the Swidden Culti­
vators of Borneo" (Master's thesis, Cornell University, 1979), pp. 17-18, for a 
discussion of village territorial rights, including rights to secondary and primary 
forest areas, or "virgin jungle," as Weinstock calls it.
11. Magenda, "East Kalimantan," pp. 4, 42.
12. J. R. Wortman, "The Sultanate of Kutai Kalimantan Timur: A Sketch of the 
Traditional Political Structure," Borneo Research Bulletin, 3, no. 2 (December 
1971), pp. 52-53. East Borneo was part of the Residency of South and East Bor­
neo based in Banjarmasin.
13. Magenda, pp. 23, 42, 24.
14. Ib id ., p . 59.
15. Ib id ., p. 64.
16. Weinstock, "Land Tenure Practices," pp. 97-99.
17. These statements all refer only to wild rattan. In East Kalimantan, rattan is 
cultivated most extensively in the southern district of Pasir. Informants also re­
ported that there were rattan gardens in other parts of East Kalimantan, particu­
larly in the Kutai district. Various systems of harvest and payment for harvest 
were reported,although extensive documentation has not yet been made of these. 
Weinstock reports on traditional planting techniques still in operation in Central 
Kalimantan (personal communication). Most statements in this paper concerning 
harvesting and trading rights refer to that rattan which grows wild in the” forest.
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transportation and communications, changes in government priorities, the timber 
"boom," and lack of alternative cash-earning opportunities.
In 1959 the government banned the Chinese from upriver areas, and as a re­
sult the Chinese traders had to entrust their business operations in these regions 
to other Indonesians working for them. Within two or three years many of these 
non-Chinese traders bought the businesses. Soon afterwards, however, the gov­
ernment lifted the ban on Chinese traveling upriver, while continuing to restrict 
their right to live there, except under "special" circumstances. Consequently the 
Chinese and their former employees became competitors, each group developing 
their own complex networks of middlemen.
During the early 1960s motorized river boats began to come into general use in 
the trading networks. Since they replaced the rowing boats manned by local crews 
of nine to twenty men, they reduced employment opportunities and also made river 
travel and transport of produce less time consuming and more efficient. At the 
same time, an increasing local demand for imported goods further stimulated the 
growth in traffic. Boom periods,during which certain forest products (such as 
crocodile skins and timber) were in high demand on the world market, brought an 
influx of "luxury" items, ranging from white sugar, ready-made cigarettes, and 
ready-to-wear clothing, to radios, motorcycles, and chainsaws. Since rattan col­
lecting was one of the few means of earning the cash income needed to buy such 
items, increasing numbers participated in collection or small-scale trade, even 
though most collectors considered it a sideline to farming.
An explosion of general economic prosperity accompanied the beginning of the 
timber boom in the late 1960s.18 Without warning, in 1970 the central government 
restricted the general trade in logs and allocated commercial logging rights to large- 
scale timber companies. Entrepreneurs who had bought boats or shops to profit 
from the logging boom now used them instead to deal in foodstuffs and trade goods 
or rattan and forest products, or both. Others were contracted by the timber com­
panies to pull log rafts down river. Commercial logging activities also opened up 
formerly remote forest areas, with logging roads facilitating access to distant rat­
tan-growing regions and increasing the rate at which the rattan could be harvested. 
During and following the manual logging and commercial timber boom (1967-78) many 
people from all over Indonesia flocked to East Kalimantan seeking employment. The 
indigenous population was also increasing naturally. During production or hiring 
lags in the timber industry, many of the unemployed turned to the collection or 
small-scale trade of wild rattan and other nontimber forest products.
In the mid- to late-1970s the world market demand for rattan rose while the 
proportion produced by the Philippines, the world's other major producer, declined. 
The Philippine government began to enforce existing laws more actively to protect 
their forest resources, including rattan, at the same time as the Japanese demand 
for Indonesian rattan was rising sharply. The culmination of these interacting fac­
tors was a burgeoning of once smooth-functioning trade networks. Large- and 
small-scale traders were seeking a finite resource: rattan.
To understand how this affected the society of East Kalimantan and its existing 
resources, it is necessary to analyze in greater detail how the river-trade networks 
actually operate.
18. See Chris Manning, "The Timber Boom with Special Reference to East Kaliman­
tan," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 7, no. 3 (November 1971), pp. 30-60 
for further explanation of this important episode in the East Kalimantan logging 
industry.
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The Trade Networks
When in the early 1970s the government restricted the trade in logs to certain 
large companies, many timber buyers in the cities experienced huge losses from 
the credit they had extended upriver. Those who survived by switching to trading 
in minor forest products were naturally unwilling to extend credit to any traders 
not directly responsible to them, some agreeing to pay cash only on delivery of 
forest produce. As a result, numerous new arrangements for the allocation of 
credit have evolved along the network, most of them between participants of adja­
cent levels of trade.
Virtually anyone willing to invest the capital and take the risks has been able 
to enter the trade sphere. Collection points of various sizes are located in villages 
along, and at confluences of, the major rivers, the main trading artery being the 
Mahakam. Boats are supposed to be registered with the River Traffic Authority 
(LLASDF), which issues licenses allowing the vessels to carry passengers and some 
commercial cargo (taxi boats), or only commercial cargo (trade boats). In early 
1980, LLASDF officials estimated that only 50 percent of the river boats were legally 
registered, and blamed this administrative shortcoming on insufficient docking facil­
ities and staff.
Possession of a boat is not a prerequisite for buying rattan. Some small-scale 
traders, or "river middlemen," purchase 100-kilogram sacks of sugar, cases of 
cigarettes, and drums of kerosene in Samarinda (or Tanjung Selor, Tarakan, or 
Balikpapan), and pay their passage by taxi boat to a particular upriver locale. At 
these points, their goods are sold on credit or for cash and rattan purchased from 
local collectors. The rattan is transported downriver by taxiboat, and the fee paid 
by the trader is determined by the weight of the rattan.
Middlemen trading at different points along the network must deal with the 
problem of environmental constraints on transportation and communication between 
forest collection sites and the urban buyers; the socioeconomic circumstances of, 
and relationships between, individuals involved in collection or trade activities; 
and/or the traditional controls on forest-product collection and trade, in effect be­
fore the current government-imposed regulations. These constraints have influ­
enced the operations of traders in different parts of the systems and defined pos­
sible links throughout the riverine trade networks.
Figure A depicts the general situation, showing the possible trading links 
within the system. Local variations exist and are particularly common in the most 
isolated regions (where missionary planes sometimes replace boats) and in those 
areas where overland transport is possible. The following are the major partici­
pants in the trading network.
Village middlemen are traders living in particular villages or parts of the forest 
who act as liaison between forest collectors in those locales and village shopkeepers 
in larger villages or trade centers. As used here, "village middlemen" refers to 
traders who do not own stores but take trade goods on the behalf of a village shop, 
a trade boat, or a river middleman to distribute to collectors working in distant or 
isolated forest areas.
Village shopkeepers own shops in the villages and sell trade goods and food­
stuffs to forest collectors and village middlemen. Goods may be sold for cash or 
credit; repayment of debts is generally in forest products of an equivalent cash 
value. The village shopkeeper sells the forest products he collects to large-scale 
river middlemen, trade boats, or directly to urban buyers.
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FIGURE A. POSSIBLE UPWARD TRADE LINKS 
IN RIVERINE TRADE NETWORKS IN EAST KALIMANTAN
-----------rare links
-----------common links
River middlemen are independent traders who do not own shops or boats but do 
buy forest products for cash or in exchange for basic supplies (such as kerosene, 
salt, sugar, coffee, tobacco, cigarettes, soap, etc.) from collectors, village middle­
men, or village shopkeepers. To transport forest products to the city, these mid­
dlemen pay fees to taxi boats from collection points along major river systems. De­
pending on the size of their operation, some also hire motorized canoes to enter 
smaller tributaries in interior locales. River middlemen sell to either urban buyers 
or trade boats.
Trade boat owner/operators make regular upriver trips, bringing cash or trade 
goods to exchange for forest products. Wholesale trade boat operators deal almost 
exclusively with village shopkeepers, river middlemen, or retail trade boat opera­
tors (who function as "floating" village shopkeepers) and sell to urban buyers. 
Retail trade boat operators buy from village middlemen, small village shopkeepers, 
and, occasionally, from collectors. They sell to wholesale trade boat operators, 
river middlemen, or urban buyers.
Urban buyers are the last link in the trade networks in East Kalimantan and 
connect the network with foreign importers or exporters based in other Indonesian 
cities. They buy most of their forest products from trade boat operators or river 
middlemen, but sometimes purchase produce from other independent traders (vil­
lage shopkeepers and others) or collectors who come to the urban area. From some 
of these towns and cities, the urban buyer himself deploys groups of collectors to 
gather forest produce.
Between the different levels of the network there are many kinds of credit 
arrangements. A village shopkeeper, for example, will extend goods on credit to a
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collector, who will generally pay off his debt with an equivalent amount of rattan 
A trade boat operator, who has provided the shopkeeper with trade goods and 
foodstuffs and received regular payments for these wares, may be willing to lend 
the shopkeeper additional goods to be paid back in cash or, preferably, in rattan. 
Yet the trade boat operator would be reluctant to extend credit to a forest collector 
because this would impinge on the shopkeeper's territory and the trade boat opera­
tor would not be able to monitor the collector. During the two-to-four week period 
that the trade boat is away, the collector might sell his best rattan for cash to an­
other trader or run away from the creditor altogether. The shopkeeper, on the 
other hand, is more likely to know each collector personally and is in a better posi­
tion to make sure the collector does not sell to another shopkeeper or boat.
There is a clear distinction between traders who are interested in long-term 
security and those seeking merely short-term profit. In particular, traders who 
own some fixed capital--a boat, a shop, or relatively large quantities of durable 
goods in stock--appear to prefer the benefits of continued trade activity to those 
benefits gained by rapid liquidation of assets. But "ad-hoc river middlemen," that 
is, those who venture upriver only when rattan prices in the city are particularly 
high, have increased the level of competition among traders. These middlemen ex­
ploit their positions and try to make quick profits without concern for future trans­
actions or maintaining relations with other traders and collectors. In general, their 
presence seems to have encouraged collectors to sell any quality of rattan for cash. 
The collector in debt to a local shopkeeper can get immediate cash from one of these 
ad-hoc middlemen and temporarily avoid paying his debt. Such occurrences have 
resulted in the adoption of a cash-only policy by village shopkeepers in many vil­
lages close to Samarinda.
Whether or not the government intervenes, rapid changes in the system are 
probably inevitable. As long as the timber companies continue to cut the forest, 
their employees will require the foodstuffs and trade goods provided by river trad­
ers. If no action is taken, access to rattan sources will remain unrestricted and 
become easier as timber companies cut roads into the forest. Labor from other is­
lands will continue to be attracted to East Kalimantan by the prospect of working 
for the timber companies, while the companies may or may not continue their poli­
cies of contracting labor crews from other islands. Labor surpluses, including 
migrants who were never employed in the timber industry (but cannot afford to re­
turn home) and those indigenous and migrant workers who have been laid off by 
the companies, would have nowhere to seek income but in "traditional occupations." 
As we know, these options include collection or small-scale trade of minor forest 
products or petty trade in foodstuffs and household or agricultural goods. Thus, 
if present trends continue, the trade networks will expand even more, competition 
for forest products and customers will heighten, and the resources will become in­
creasingly scarce.
The Government Plan
As mentioned above, the Indonesian government has proposed a plan to regu­
late the trade and collection of rattan. This plan was drawn up in 1980, 19 and pre­
sented at a national forestry conference held in March of that year, when represen­
tatives of the forestry division of the Department of Agriculture and trade-related 
government agencies and departments discussed its provisions with exporters of 
rattan and other nontimber forest products. In order to improve licensing systems,
19. Sek. Ditjen. Kehutanan, "Perijinan Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Non Kayu," mimeo. 
(Jakarta, 1980).
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harvesting techniques, and the processing of nontimber forest products (especially 
rattan), the plan called for implementation of the 1974 decree of the Minister of 
Agriculture, 20 providing for permits, or HPHH (Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, 
Licenses to Harvest Forest Produce) for nontimber forest products to be issued to 
specific urban buyers. These licenses would designate the varieties and quantities 
of rattan that buyers would be permitted to harvest in a specific locale for up to 
six months. Although the details of administering the HPHH were not included in 
the 1980 proposal, there was a general consensus at the March conference that the 
licensed urban buyer would be linked directly to the KUD (Koperasi Unit Desa, 
Village Cooperative Units), the cooperatives established and controlled by the gov­
ernment to handle rice marketing, at either the village or the subdistrict level.
The plan strongly implied that the buyer would be expected to advance credit to 
the KUD prior to receiving the rattan. These advances would then support the 
collectors while they gathered rattan in the forest. Details not clarified in the plan 
were who would bear its initial implementation costs, whether the rattan would be 
transported by government boat, by the buyer's boat (if he had one), or by other 
means, and who would set the prices at either end of the transaction.
This plan can be viewed as a shift from private to public entrepreneurship.
Such public management of rattan resources would allegedly prevent excessive 
overexploitation, in that elimination of middlemen would not only increase the col­
lector's profits but would also relieve some of the pressure on the rattan resources. 
Yet, there are many disadvantages to the plan. In presenting it, the government 
argued that public regulation was needed to curb the "monopoly power" of the mid­
dlemen and traders. While Chinese export firms do monopolize the export of rattan 
from East Kalimantan, middlemen in the internal marketing networks in fact often 
perform real services for the collectors and traders with whom they work.21 Some 
traders, for example, pay hospitalization or medicine costs for their regular sup­
pliers and their families; others provide labor opportunities when trade-related jobs 
are scarce. The present system also guards the collector against financial loss in 
the wake of unexpected environmental disasters (flooding, droughts) and in some 
ways protects him against market fluctuations. Certain of these transportation and 
marketing risks are now absorbed by the middlemen. For example, if rattan be­
comes wet enroute to the city via the river, a trader having a regular relationship 
with a higher-level buyer need not absorb the loss all by himself--his regular buyer
20. Menteri Pertanian Republik Indonesia, Surat Keputusan Menteri Pertanian, 
official document no. 749/kpts/um/12/1974.
21. On the role of middlemen, see also Donald K. Emmerson, Rethinking Artisanal 
Fisheries Development: Western Concepts, Asian Experiences, World Bank Staff 
Working Paper No. 423 (Washington, D .C .: The World Bank, October 1980); Ray­
mond Firth, Malay Fishermen: Their Personal Economy, 2nd ed. rev. (Hamden, 
Conn.: Archon, 1966) ; Alice G. Dewey, Peasant Marketing in Java (New York: 
Glencoe Free Press, 1962); Ian R. Smith, "A Research Framework for Traditional 
Fisheries" (Manila: ICLARM [International Center for Living Aquatic Resources 
Management] , 1979); Nancy LeePeluso, "Survival Strategies of Rural Women Trad­
ers or a Woman's Place is in the Market: Four Case Studies from Northwestern Sle- 
man in the Special Region of Yogyakarta" (Paper presented to International Labour 
Office Jakarta for use by the Department of Manpower, Jakarta, 1980). Cf. Clifton 
Wharton, "Marketing, Merchandising and Moneylending: A Note on Middleman Monop­
sony in Malaya" (Agricultural Development Council reprint, 1962); R. C. Stirrat, 
"Fish to Market: Traders in Rural Sri Lanka," South Asia Review, 7, no. 1 (1973), 
pp. 189-207, and others who regard middlemen in general as "rapacious monopso- 
nists."
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may share it by paying the trade boat operator at or just above his cost. In the 
planned cooperatives, no such safeguards as yet exist; and the likelihood is high 
that excess costs would have to be borne by the collectors alone.
Furthermore, by requiring participation in a government cooperative, the 
"monopoly power" of the middleman would be replaced by a much stronger monop­
oly. The trader-provider services, the varied credit schemes, and the leverage 
of the collectors and small-scale traders in the credit market would be reduced. 
Market participants would not be free to determine when to collect or trade; the 
part-time nature and flexibility characteristic of nontimber forest products' collec­
tion and trade might disappear as people felt impelled to repay loans quickly for 
fear of government reprisal. Such feelings could result in more people collecting 
rattan full-time, or at least more frequently than now, further straining the re­
sources.
By rendering private lending illegal (in the interests of the cooperative sys­
tem) , alternative sources of credit would become more expensive (because they 
would be considered "black market" and carry greater risk ). The poorest borrow­
ers would be the least likely to have the means for repayment; the plan could thus 
create more problems than solutions.
The government proposal implies that urban buyers would extend credit to up­
river villages via the government cooperative, the KUD. Two obvious disadvan­
tages to such a proposal, are that in most of the riverine villages covered by this 
research, KUDs have not been established, and within the KUD structure, few in­
centives exist for good service. Furthermore, in East Kalimantan, government 
accounting is notoriously costly and inaccurate--often because of the limited facil­
ities as one proceeds further upriver. Greater burdens in terms of staffing and 
responsibilities would be placed on the KUD if both rice marketing and rattan pro­
duction and trade were in their jurisdiction. It is true that the prices of goods and 
credit increase with each middleman handling them, but it is also true that the sala­
ries of government officials operating the networks would involve similar costs, and 
there is no reason to believe that public middlemen would be less inclined than pri­
vate middlemen to extract "fees" or "taxes" out of this credit (in cash or in kind). 
Many KUDs which handle rice marketing in Java and other parts of Indonesia have 
reported problems with management of funds. Often, the rice purchased by the 
KUD cannot be sold competitively and profitably. In addition, if the government 
were to replace the middlemen's roles, its officials would still lack the kind of ex­
perience and contacts needed to acquire timely information about the supply and 
demand of rattan in both interior source areas and external markets. Private en­
trepreneurs in the cities would still control external marketing information.
Viewed from the other end of the network, the need for checks in the system of 
credit extension makes it unlikely that urban buyers would be receptive to the gov­
ernment's plan for them to extend credit directly to specific rattan-collecting vil­
lages, 100, 300, or 600 kilometers upriver. The current system allows the risks in 
such credit arrangements to be spread out over a number of stages of trade ( i . e . , 
the credit system consists of a series of local loans between people at adjacent levels 
of trade). As mentioned above, since suffering great losses in timber speculation 
in the early 1970s, downriver traders have become discriminating in determining 
who may borrow money or goods. Those who will still extend credit do so only to 
close associates, and long-term loans are far preferred to long-distance loans.
Credit is granted those traders who remain loyal to individual buyers or those who 
make reliable repayments on their loans. Mutual trust is a key element of these 
credit ties and such trust is based on mutual understanding. The cultural gap be­
tween the large-scale rattan buyers in the cities and the upriver village rattan
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collectors makes trust and understanding nearly impossible between them. The 
government plan, therefore, would eliminate the localized and personal nature of 
credit extension without any consideration of the social and environmental con­
straints inherent in their "direct" long-distance loans between producers and final 
domestic buyers.
Alternative Means of Management 
of Rattan Collection and Trade
In proposing an alternative to the government's plan, it is necessary to con­
sider two levels of the problem. First, the need to limit access to the supplies of 
rattan so that the resources are not overexploited; and second, the need to ensure 
that changes in the trading network do not adversely affect the local society and 
that those who have previously participated at the various levels of the river-trade 
network are provided with alternative sources of income.
With regard to the first of these problems, one method often proposed for lim­
iting access to a natural resource is allocation of private property rights to partic­
ular individuals, who are likely to manage mpre efficiently and profitably the re­
sources on their land. Apart from the difficulties involved in deciding to whom and 
how to allocate the land, such an alternative would seem impractical and undesirable 
in the case of East Kalimantan's rattan-growing areas; not only would it isolate many 
of the people from a major source of livelihood, and overturn the existing commun­
ity structure, but it would also run the risk of a new owner at some stage maximiz­
ing his own profits by stripping the land of the rattan, selling it, and reinvesting 
his profits in a more lucrative enterprise.
A more practical alternative would be to design a system of group ownership, 
whereby benefits of increased production would be more widely distributed. To be 
effective, such a system would need to be based on local social and economic coop­
erative structures rather than on a superimposed hypothetical plan designed by 
"outside experts" lacking understanding of indigenous networks and institutions. 
Very small groups would be preferable to subdistrict organizations to simplify man­
agement and decision-making procedures. To avoid overexploitation of the rattan 
on the property, it would be necessary to build in a number of incentives to en­
courage the joint owners to conserve the area under their jurisdiction. For exam­
ple, permission to harvest rattan or participate in the rattan trade could be contin­
gent on compliance with sustained yield management procedures.
Under any kind of management, an incentive system requires an appropriate 
procedure for rule enforcement. Local social sanctions on violators or potential 
violators, in combination with or prior to governmental sanctions, would be the 
ideal arrangement for control of resource use. Moreover, the opinions and ideas 
of collectors and traders in regard to problems anticipated in designing management 
groups or other systems are crucial to the success of the endeavor. Continued 
feedback from participating collectors and traders could lead to development of 
locally relevant management schemes which would improve the sustained yield of 
rattan. As Thomson has pointed out, such improvements could justify the high 
decision-making costs of organizing user groups and coordinating their participa­
tion in planning. 22 *
22. James T . Thomson, "Guesselbodi Forest: Alternative Frameworks for Sustained
Yield Management" (Report prepared for Niger Forestry and Land Use Planning, 
Maryland, 1981), p. 48.
105
In recent years, particularly since the arrival of foreign timber companies, 
local people have come to feel their interests are not given sufficient consideration. 
Not only have they reported hostile confrontations with timber company personnel, 
they have also been discouraged by the government's regulations drastically limiting 
the villagers' rights to harvest timber. If the local people were allowed or encour­
aged to participate in the design and implementation of rattan-harvest management 
schemes, they might be more eager to enforce regulation of harvesting procedures.
Again, the major cost of limiting access to any common property resource is the 
exclusion of potential entrants (a very expensive cost in a society where income­
generating opportunities are scarce and people seeking employment are many). But 
as Smith has pointed out limited resources of an "open access" nature do not them­
selves lead to low income unless entry to the resource is unchecked. 23
The second major step to alleviate the pressure on the system would be to cre­
ate alternative employment opportunities in the vicinities of rattan trade and collec­
tion centers. Group property rights could be allocated as discussed above, and a 
version of the present trade system could be allowed to continue, although under 
much less pressure of potential expansion.
Rather than eliminating the functions of all middlemen, viable income-producing 
alternatives in the vicinity could be offered. The ideal types of enterprises would 
be those that could increase the quantity and improve the quality of rattan--such 
as rattan plantations and first-stage rattan processing centers. In many villages 
in the districts of Kutai and Pasir, farmers traditionally planted rattan in their dry 
fields ( ladang) before letting them go to fallow. During the seven to ten years that 
elapsed before the rattan could be harvested for the first time2* they cultivated 
rice and vegetables in other, newly cleared fields. In some areas, planting rattan 
in dry fields is still common practice, but not in others. Yet the precedent for 
rattan plantations, at least on a small scale, has been set.
Former middlemen could be employed in processing centers as receivers, check­
ers, weighers, graders, supervisors, or processors. Because of their current 
skills, costs of further training would be minimal. Incorporating them would avoid 
the individual costs and resentful feelings that might result if they are excluded. 
The application of their skills, the total revenues earned from their work, and the 
avoidance of deprivation costs to them, constitute come of the social benefits in­
volved in such a plan.
An example of the potential success of first-stage processing centers is what 
has developed in the Middle Mahakam village of Long Hubung. Established in 1978 
by a local man (of the Busang Dayak ethnic group), the center employs between 
eighty and two hundred people at a time who clean, sun-dry, sulfur-treat, pack,
23. Ian R. Smith, "A Research Framework for Traditional Fisheries" (Manila: 
ICLARM [International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management], 1979), 
p. 9. 24*
24. The time until the first harvest varies according to the variety of rattan. 
Traditionally, 10-20 percent of the stems in a clump of Calamus caesius would be 
cut each year, with the remainder left to grow for up to five to ten years longer. 
Stems of Calamus trachycoleus, which does not grow in clumps, would be cut suc­
cessively further back into the forest. See John Dransfeld, A Manual of the Rat­
tans of the Malay Peninsula, Malayan Forest Report no. 29 (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry 
of Primary Industries, 1979), and Burkill, Dictionary of the Economic Products of 
the Malay Peninsula, pp. 1904-5, for more detailed information on the natural his­
tory of rattans.
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and load rattan. Much of the rattan has been brought by canoe or raft from up­
river locales through four sets of rapids which render the river impassable for 
trade boats. His success is evident not only in his thriving rattan business, but 
also in the way it has stimulated development in Long Hubung. A new school (the 
only junior high school in the area), a village meeting hall, numerous houses, a 
dormitory for school children whose parents live above the rapids, and his three 
trade boats are a few of the tangible proofs that such a venture can succeed and 
have considerable multiplier effects. Indirect benefits include the increased de­
mand for services by the processing center's employees.
Other foreseeable advantages of establishing upriver processing centers and 
plantations include control of the quality of harvested rattan, better preparation 
of rattan before shipment,and upgrading the trade network.
These processing centers could refuse poor-quality canes, forcing traders to 
be more particular about the quality of rattan they accept, and collectors to cut 
more selectively. Complete drying and chemical treatment of rattan in the centers 
would protect it and ensure that more high and less "reject" quality would reach 
the city, thus increasing total revenues. Finally, the current trade system--which 
has adapted to environmental and market constraints--could operate more efficiently.
One potential disadvantage of this option is the competition it could stimulate 
between additional migrant laborers attracted to the area and the local people. Pro­
duction and treatment centers should be designed with a view to lessening such 
potential competition. Moreover, if property rights to the rattan resources were 
already allocated, and enforcement measures taken, the risk of overexploitation of 
the resources would be minimal. On the other hand, incoming migrants might meet 
the growing demand for services among local workers.
The seven-to-ten year waiting period before the newly planted rattan can be 
harvested might also be perceived as a disadvantage. For most households, how­
ever, rattan collection is a secondary occupation which may be put aside at points 
in the agricultural cycle when labor requirements are high. When primary or sec­
ondary forest is being cleared and burned, for example, much of the household's 
male labor is required. Such labor allocation patterns do not prevent a regular 
trader from acquiring rattan throughout the year. The timing of agricultural activ­
ities generally is consistent within each village, yet the trader is still able to obtain 
rattan from that village--although in smaller quantities. The reason is that the 
individual household still requires cash, and one or more household members, men 
or women,25 may collect rattan, while the others tend the fields. Here again, locally 
relevant knowledge is an important "skill" possessed by the trader or middleman. 
When and how labor can be mobilized to meet quotas and deadlines is crucial infor­
mation . 25
If the world demand for rattan drops, it would be possible to leave the rattan 
growing until demand and price increase. In fact, leaving the rattan to grow for 
longer periods may result in larger harvests. Informants in the southwest part of 
East Kalimantan report a rattan plant cut for the first time fifteen years after plant­
ing produces three times as much as a plant first cut seven years after planting. 26 7
25. The participation of women tends to vary among villages, ethnic groups, sea­
sons, or periods of economic prosperity and scarcity.
26. Contracts with overseas buyers are generally for a quantity of rattan to be 
delivered in the course of a year, thus the Indonesian exporter is less pressured 
by seasonal constraints on the supply.
27. Joseph Weinstock, personal communication (1982)
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Further research on the frequency of this type of occurrence would be of great 
value in planning rattan plantations.
The long-range benefits--in terms of continued employment opportunities, mul­
tiplier effects in the communities, relief of the pressure on the current trade net­
works (if the plantations are properly planned), and the improved quality of the 
rattan sent downriver--significantly outweigh the disadvantages. During the 
seven-to-ten year transition between planting and the first harvest, it will be 
essential to monitor the activities of timber companies in the province. Depending 
on their stages of production/timber harvest, they may be hiring or laying off 
workers--consequently, many locals and recent migrants may be seasonally or per­
manently unemployed. Some of these could be hired in the construction of a pro­
cessing center (ideally, within this interim period) and in the initial process stages. 
If such employment opportunities are not available and access to the resources is 
not restricted, surplus labor will strain the supply of rattan rather than work in a 
direction to upgrade it.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has explored the question of how much government control of rattan 
collection and trade is appropriate for East Kalimantan. 28 In the past, social con­
trols helped limit the supply, and the demand for rattan was apparently much lower 
than it is at present. However, with the disappearance of traditional controls, the 
trade networks have expanded, the world demand for rattan has risen, and the 
competition for the limited supply has increased while replanting has been minimal.
If no action is taken, a "tragedy of the commons" may play itself out, and both 
present and future generations will suffer from the lack of good rattan. As dis­
cussed above, the government’s proposal to avert such an outcome by regulating 
the collection, purchase, and sale of rattan through government-controlled "cooper­
atives," is unlikely to be effective. It is not designed to channel credit efficiently 
from downriver to upriver, and the costs of implementing it are likely to be borne 
indirectly or directly by the collectors themselves.
At this point, a return to the traditional system of tribute is also impossible. 
Perhaps the most valuable role the government could play in the rattan-growing 
areas would be to develop additional, appropriate income-earning opportunities, 
that would relieve pressure on the trade networks and the forest resources as the 
primary source of cash income. If enterprises such as rattan plantations and first- 
stage processing centers were established, these would increase the quantity and 
improve the quality of rattan, would absorb more labor, and would raise the oppor­
tunity wages of collectors. Processing rattan before shipment downriver would 
raise the upriver prices and funnel a greater percentage of profits to participants 
in the initial stages of the trade networks. Similarly, classifying rattan upriver 
according to internationally accepted grading standards would increase the value 
added in these initial stages. The availability of temporary or part-time job oppor-
28. The question is not a new one for Indonesia. In late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Java, controversy arose between private entrepreneurs and the 
Dutch government over the cutting of the teak forests. By 1913, State management 
had superseded private enterprise and efforts were made to conserve jungle woods. 
Such efforts did not receive much attention in the "Outer Provinces," however, 
particularly Borneo, because of the almost nominal administration there. See J. S. 
Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy (New York: Macmillan, 
1944), pp. 176, 201-2, 222, 325.
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tunities such as these would also allow local farmers the time to cultivate their 
fields; seasonal fluctuations in both the labor supply and the demand for the rattan 
require a flexible plan. Restricting entry into the commons--the forest--as sug­
gested earlier, demands that the people be provided with alternative employment 
opportunities to supply their increasing cash needs.
In the long run, a plan of action combining all or some of the elements described 
above will improve vertical linkages (resource--collector--distributors) and horizon­
tal linkages (between plantations--processing centers--ownership groups--and 
other rural institutions). Such a holistic approach to rural sector development 
views the solution as well as the problem as diverse wholes composed of interacting 
and interdependent parts.
